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Across ontogenetic development, individuals gather manifold experiences during which
they detect regularities in their environment and thereby accumulate knowledge. This
knowledge is used to guide behavior, make predictions, and acquire further new knowl-
edge. In this review, we discuss the influence of prior knowledge on memory from both
the psychology and the emerging cognitive neuroscience literature and provide a develop-
mental perspective on this topic. Recent neuroscience findings point to a prominent role
of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and of the hippocampus (HC) in the emergence of
prior knowledge and in its application during the processes of successful memory encod-
ing, consolidation, and retrieval. We take the lateral PFC into consideration as well and
discuss changes in both medial and lateral PFC and HC across development and postulate
how these may be related to the development of the use of prior knowledge for remem-
bering. For future direction, we argue that, to measure age differential effects of prior
knowledge on memory, it is necessary to distinguish the availability of prior knowledge
from its accessibility and use.
Keywords: lifespan development, child development, hippocampus, medial prefrontal cortex, semantic memory,
prior knowledge, lateral prefrontal cortex, episodic memory
INTRODUCTION
As humans, we do not store verbatim copies of experiences in our
memory. Rather, we integrate new incoming information from the
surroundings in relation to our pre-existing knowledge about the
world. This knowledge is accumulated across ontogenetic devel-
opment through experiences during which the individual detects
regularities in the environment. Growth in knowledge is one of
the most prominent aspects in ontogeny and exerts its influence
on memory functioning across the whole lifespan (Craik and Bia-
lystok, 2006). The importance of prior knowledge for memory
has been introduced in the classical work of Piaget (1929) and
Bartlett (1932). Bartlett (1932) showed that humans, while recall-
ing a specific event, often construct these memories based on their
knowledge about the world, thus illustrating the susceptibility of
human memories to errors due to their reconstructive nature. In
his work with children, Piaget (1929) showed that, in addition
to the assimilation of new information into existing knowledge
frames (or schemata), knowledge has to be updated frequently in
order to adapt to changing demands of the environment, a process
he called accommodation. Despite the long-standing recognition
of the important role of prior knowledge, most psychological and
cognitive neuroscience experiments are designed with the implicit
assumption that learning and memory take place in a tabula rasa
state of the brain. So far, surprisingly little is known about how the
interaction between pre-existing knowledge and new incoming
information takes place within the brain.
In the following sections, we discuss both behavioral and neu-
roscience findings concerning the influence of prior knowledge
on memory. We focus on studies that examined long-term stor-
age of memory, as prior knowledge directly influences cognitive
processes that are important for learning and retaining new infor-
mation in the memory system. The representations built up from
these processes form the basis of semantic memory, which is fac-
tual knowledge about the world, and episodic memory, which
is memory bound in time and place (Tulving, 1972). In the
remainder of the review, we outline a developmental cognitive
neuroscience perspective that combines our understanding about
changes in brain structure and function across development with
behavioral findings of age differences in the use of prior knowledge
for remembering. This developmental cognitive neuroscience per-
spective shall guide future investigations of age-related changes
in the use of prior knowledge for remembering in brain and
behavior simultaneously. Throughout the review, we use the term
prior knowledge in a broad sense as stored knowledge and beliefs
about the world that have been acquired by an individual. This
knowledge can be declarative (i.e., semantic, episodic) or non-
declarative (e.g., implicit or procedural). We hereby acknowledge
that differences among related terms such as conceptual knowl-
edge, rule knowledge, associative knowledge, and schema are not
being considered.
BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATING THE INFLUENCE OF
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON MEMORY
In a classical study, Bransford and Johnson (1972) demonstrated
the impact of prior knowledge on comprehension and memory. In
a series of experiments, participants were asked to listen to prose
passages and were afterward tested on their memory for them.
Participants who received relevant knowledge or cues before lis-
tening to the passages and therefore had prior knowledge available
showed improved comprehension and better recall compared to
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participants who either did not receive cues or received the con-
textual knowledge only after hearing the passages. In a second
experiment, Bransford and Johnson (1972) used descriptions of
activities that were known to the participants. They manipulated
whether the participants could access this knowledge by either
providing or not providing a cue that allowed the activation of
an appropriate context. As expected, comprehension and recall
were better for the group that received the cue beforehand as com-
pared to the no-cue group. In sum, the results indicate that if
prior knowledge is available and accessible, it facilitates compre-
hension and memory of new incoming information. Moreover,
these findings corroborate the view that our experiences are not
remembered as exact copies, but are actively integrated into one’s
existing knowledge structures.
In a similar vein, Craik and Lockhart (1972) argued that mem-
ory performance is not a simple function of the amount of encoded
features (that is, the more, the better), but also of the qualitative
nature of these features, i.e., how well they can be integrated into
pre-existing knowledge. For example, Craik and Tulving (1975)
demonstrated that words that were embedded in a congruent
sentence context were better remembered than those that were
embedded in an incongruent context (see also Schulman, 1974).
In addition to showing a general benefit for congruously encoded
items, Craik and Tulving (1975) also showed that a semanti-
cally rich context benefits memory for congruent words but does
not affect memory for incongruent words. These results were
taken to implicate a more elaborative encoding for congruent as
opposed to incongruent information. Also, new information is
more effectively integrated into existing semantic networks when
presented stimulus and context form one unit. Since Craik and
Tulving (1975), this so-called “congruency effect” has been repli-
cated numerous times with different stimulus materials and tasks
(e.g., Staresina et al., 2009; for a review, see Alba and Hasher, 1983).
Following the initial idea that prior knowledge benefits encod-
ing via integration into existing semantic structures, Moscov-
itch and Craik (1976) provided a retrieval-related view on the
importance of semantic context. In an incidental encoding task,
participants read words on a screen and were asked to indicate
whether those words either rhyme with another word, fit into a
given category, or fit into a given sentence. The latter task was
assumed to provide the deepest level of encoding. In addition,
they manipulated retrieval conditions by irregularly presenting
the initial encoding questions once more that did (yes-answers)
or did not (no-answers) form a congruent unit with the target
word. They showed that both cueing and congruency at retrieval
enhanced recall and that this worked best in combination with
deep levels of encoding. The results led the authors to postulate
that recall performance depends on three factors: the quality of the
trace (defined by the level of processing), the presence of retrieval
cues, and the degree of congruity of the items with their context.
Put differently, deep encoding comes along with a high poten-
tial of being remembered. The extent to which this potential is
realized, however, depends on whether the retrieval context pro-
vides enough information to recreate the encoding context and on
whether this context and the target stimulus form one unit. When
all (or some) conditions are met, the retrieval of accurate targets
will be facilitated.
Although it is well accepted that semantic congruency promotes
memory performance, events that are incongruent to the prevail-
ing context have also been shown to-be-remembered well. For
example, the classical von Restorff-effect (Köhler and von Restorff,
1937) denotes that an item that is distinct from its surrounding
items is more likely to-be-remembered than one that is not (also
called “isolation effect”). Whether a given memory event profits
from congruency or incongruency probably depends on several
contextual features, such as the occurrence ratio between congru-
ent and incongruent information (Alba and Hasher, 1983; Rojahn
and Pettigrew, 1992). By taking a 50/50 ratio of congruent and
incongruent stimuli, differences in saliency are reduced, which
would be more prominent for, say, an 80/20 ratio in which the less
frequent material type is expected to show isolation-like memory
benefits (Hunt and Lamb, 2001).
However, explaining effects of distinctiveness with saliency or
isolation alone is not sufficient. One intuitive mechanism through
which distinctiveness operates is the effect of increased attention
to the salient item, which is sparked by, for example, an emotional
response to salience or surprise (Hunt and Lamb, 2001). Con-
trary to this explanation, it was shown that subjectively perceived
salience is not necessary for the isolation effect (Dunlosky et al.,
2000). Alternatively, distinctiveness can be understood as“the pro-
cessing of difference in the context of similarity” (Hunt and Lamb,
2001). This implies that distinctiveness is not a property of the
physical objects, but a certain kind of cognitive processing that
creates more elaborate traces for isolated items. Accordingly, the
end product of distinctive processing is an elaborate memory trace
that is highly unique and easy to access during retrieval. Although
this notion focuses on memory benefits due to the incongruity
of an event, it is consistent with the general notion of the levels-
of-processing account stating that remembering depends on the
degree of elaboration of a trace during encoding in relation to
existing knowledge structures (Craik and Lockhart, 1972).
CONCLUSION REGARDING BEHAVIORAL DATA
Prior knowledge facilitates processing of new incoming informa-
tion, supposedly because it provides a structure into which the
new information can be integrated, which may lead to an elabo-
rated memory trace. This advantage of prior knowledge may hold,
no matter if the new information meets expectations (is congruent
with existing knowledge) or not (is incongruent). However, having
prior knowledge available does not suffice, it needs to be accessed
and used to benefit encoding (Bransford and Johnson, 1972; Alba
and Hasher, 1983). Moreover, an elaborated memory trace only
provides potential for later remembering. The extent to which this
potential is realized might then depend on whether the retrieval
context matches the encoding context to a certain degree and on
whether it is distinct enough to activate the specific target trace.
This suggests that it is necessary to look at retrieval as well in order
to understand the memory benefit for elaborated information.
During retrieval, semantic knowledge might help to reinstate
the encoding context, which was shown to be facilitated if the item
is expected to occur in the specific context based upon prior knowl-
edge (Moscovitch and Craik, 1976). From a spreading activation
network perspective, an existing semantic structure provides a
search space that is likely to contain additional routes by which the
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new information can be inferred if direct retrieval fails (Anderson,
1981). This may also be true if the item posits a mismatch with
the context, as the degree of distinctiveness or novelty can also be
diagnostic at retrieval. From a neuroscience point of view, how-
ever, only little is known about how these computations are carried
out in the brain. In the next section, we will review recent neuro-
science findings concerning the processing of information related
to prior knowledge, particularly during memory processing.
A NEUROIMAGING VIEW ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY
This section will first offer an overview over initial evidence sug-
gesting the involvement of the medial temporal lobe [(MTL),
especially the hippocampus (HC)] and PFC structures in the coor-
dination of forming and applying knowledge. Based on this, we
will examine the roles of MTL and PFC in making use of prior
knowledge for the service of memory encoding, consolidation,
as well as retrieval. A large part of this section will deal with
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and HC, as recent evidence and
theorizing suggest both areas to be key regions for understand-
ing the interplay between knowledge and memory functions. In
addition, we will discuss the involvement of lateral PFC subre-
gions. The latter provide important control and elaborative func-
tions with regard to accessing and evaluating internal mnemonic
representations.
The hippocampal formation forms part of the MTL and is a
set of cortical regions comprising the dentate gyrus (DG) and the
individual CA-fields in the HC as well as the subicular complex.
The entorhinal cortex, perirhinal cortex, as well as the parahip-
pocampal cortex, which all surround the HC, also play a role in
the functioning of memory as they are the primary sources of
neocortical inputs to the HC (Squire, 1992; Andersen et al., 2007).
Regarding subregions of the mPFC that are presumably relevant
to prior knowledge, we refer to Brodmann areas (BA) 12 and 25,
the ventral parts of BA 32, and the medial parts of BA 10 and
BA 11. Taken together, those subregions are similar to the sub-
genual ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) as defined by Nieuwenhuis
and Takashima (2011), but also include anterior and dorsal parts
of BA 10. There is a broad literature about mPFC function and
anatomy in rodents. However, as this is not the main focus of the
present review, the interested reader might refer to Nieuwenhuis
and Takashima (2011) for an overview and comparison with the
human mPFC.
THE EMERGENCE OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE COORDINATED
INTERACTION BETWEEN mPFC AND HC
Both MTL and PFC play a crucial role in the emergence and appli-
cation of abstract knowledge, as demonstrated by Kumaran et al.
(2009). In this study, participants played the role of weather fore-
casters and had to learn which patterns of associative visual stimuli
predicted sun or rain. This task could either be solved by learning
the concrete surface pattern or by abstracting the commonali-
ties across relevant patterns. The latter would supposedly lead to
the emergence of conceptual knowledge that would allow transfer
to new situations. The degree to which the participants acquired
abstract knowledge was tested with a transfer task. Here the same
higher-order task structure was used, but with different patterns
of visual stimuli, thus making it necessary for the participants
to reactivate the abstract conceptual representation acquired dur-
ing the learning phase. The gradual acquisition of knowledge that
allowed successful weather predictions was positively correlated
with activation in the mPFC, HC, and posterior cingulate cortex.
Moreover, better knowledge about the hierarchical structure was
associated with an increased functional coupling between the HC
and mPFC. The transfer task revealed correlations between trans-
fer performance and neural activity in the left HC. A subsequent
study by Kumaran et al. (2012) corroborated those initial observa-
tions. There, the authors explored the formation of knowledge of
social and non-social hierarchies and its impact on the ability to
perform transitive inference (e.g., if A>B and B>C, then A>C).
Again, activity increases in the posterior HC and the mPFC par-
alleled the emergence of hierarchy knowledge, independent of it
being a social or a non-social hierarchy (Kumaran et al., 2012).
The HC has traditionally been implicated in the creation and
retrieval of enduring episodic memory traces (e.g., Simons and
Spiers, 2003). Along this line, the role of specific HC-subfields
(e.g., the DG) in the orthogonalization of representations of sim-
ilar input patterns has been highlighted (i.e., pattern separation;
McClelland et al., 1995). More recent studies also demonstrate
HC involvement in inferential processing, such as flexibly com-
bining memories to allow knowledge transfer (Zeithamova and
Preston, 2010). Generalization across episodes might be sup-
ported via recurrent processing (i.e., pattern completion), either
within specific HC-subfields (i.e., CA3/CA1; Marr, 1971; Treves
and Rolls, 1992) or in larger HC-entorhinal cortex loops that act
upon orthogonalized representations (for an in depth overview,
see Kumaran and McClelland, 2012). Hence, a crucial facet of effi-
cient HC processing resides in maintaining a fine balance between
pattern separation and pattern completion operations (Yassa and
Stark, 2011). These postulations still need to be validated by empir-
ical evidence but might give a hint on how the HC is involved in
constructing new abstract knowledge and how hippocampal com-
putations may be susceptible to attentional modulation, possibly
from the PFC (Duncan et al., 2009).
The mPFC, in turn, has traditionally been implicated in various
functions including self-referential processing (e.g., Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004) and processing of reward-related information
(e.g., Behrens et al., 2008). Given its involvement in reward pro-
cessing, Kumaran et al. (2009) suggested that the mPFC may guide
decision-making by integrating information received from the
HC (discrete memories of encountering specific associative visual
stimuli) with its associated value information (e.g., correctness of
prediction, gain, and losses).
It is important to note that actual knowledge is probably not
stored within the mPFC or the HC. In spite of the rich literature on
representation of knowledge in the brain, we will limit ourselves to
the statement that the storage of human knowledge corresponds
to a network of parietal and temporal heteromodal association
areas that receives input from multiple modalities (for review and
meta-analysis, see Binder et al., 2009; Binder and Desai, 2011).
HC and mPFC are suggested to form a network that builds up
and integrates associative information with valuation, which then
guides the acquisition of new conceptual knowledge (Kumaran
et al., 2009). So far, the exact mechanisms through which the HC,
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mPFC, and parietal/temporal association areas interact remain
unclear.
In the subsequent section, we will discuss how the HC and the
mPFC are involved in memory processes, starting with encoding
and retrieval and followed by the consolidation of memories.
THE EFFECTS OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE DURING MEMORY ENCODING:
THE ROLES OF mPFC AND HIPPOCAMPUS
The initial findings by Bransford and Johnson (1972) that prior
knowledge boosts comprehension and memory have been cor-
roborated by neuroimaging work that tried to identify the neural
correlates of this enhancement. An early PET-study (Maguire et al.,
1999) adapted the paradigm of Bransford and Johnson (1972) by
providing participants with relevant, irrelevant, or no visual cues
before listening to stories in which the storyline was difficult to
grasp. Maguire et al. (1999) revealed activations in the dorsal pos-
terior cingulate area (PCC, BA 31) that was related to hearing
the unusual passage when the helpful context picture was pre-
sented beforehand. Participants’ ratings of the comprehensibility
of the stories were positively correlated with activation in BA 31
and in ventral medial orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11) while activa-
tion in the left middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) was correlated with
actual memory performance. These early findings emphasize the
importance of prior knowledge for comprehension and memory
by showing increased neural activations in medio-frontal regions
(BA 10, BA 11) when knowledge is available during learning of
new information.
More recent fMRI work examined effects of prior knowledge
directly during episodic memory encoding. In a study by van
Kesteren et al. (2010a), the availability of prior knowledge was
manipulated by exposing two groups of participants to the first
80 min of a movie, either in correct (consistent schema) or scram-
bled order (inconsistent schema). On the next day’s fMRI session,
participants watched the movie’s final 15 min in original order,
after which they stayed in the scanner for an additional 15 min rest-
ing period (administered 10 min after encoding). Participants with
an inconsistent schema showed higher correlations between HC-
and mPFC-activity and less mPFC intersubject-synchronization, a
measure of across-subject BOLD signal coherence. The higher cor-
relation between HC and mPFC in the inconsistent schema group
was interpreted as compensatory connectivity in order to make up
for their lack of consistent schema. Interestingly, this increased cor-
relation persisted during the 15 min post-encoding resting period,
suggesting that a lack of prior knowledge could have resulted in
increased spontaneous replay of the newly encoded information.
In a subsequent study, van Kesteren et al. (2013) assessed the
influence of subjectively perceived congruency on mPFC and HC
activation. In the MRI scanner, participants rated the congruency
of object-scene pairs (e.g., classroom – chalk). About 24 h later
outside of the scanner, they were tested on item and associative
memory of the pairs. van Kesteren et al. (2013) examined the
so-called subsequent memory effect, in which brain activations
from encoding trials that resulted in subsequent remembering are
directly contrasted with trials that are subsequently forgotten. The
mPFC displayed an increase in the subsequent memory effect with
congruency, whereas the left parahippocampal cortex showed a
decrease with congruency in the subsequent memory effect. These
findings support the notion that the mPFC plays a key role in the
integration of new congruent information, whereas MTL areas are
involved during the encoding of incongruent information (van
Kesteren et al., 2012).
Taken together, initial evidence points to an involvement of
mPFC and MTL regions during the encoding of new information
that can be related to prior knowledge. In the next section, we will
expand on these findings and examine the role of mPFC and HC
in memory consolidation and retrieval.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF mPFC AND HC IN MEMORY CONSOLIDATION
AND RETRIEVAL
The importance of prior knowledge for memory consolidation
was emphasized in a recent review by Wang and Morris (2010).
The authors argue that the brain stores associative frameworks
of knowledge, which are supposedly implemented as networks of
interconnected neocortical representations. The dynamic build-
up of such structures is made possible by activity-dependent
synaptic plasticity, as well as dendritic and synaptic growth. Hence,
setting up such associative knowledge structures takes time. If
these structures exist, however, the assimilation of related new
information is expected to be facilitated, which would lead to
speeded consolidation.
This reasoning is backed by studies with rats (Tse et al., 2007,
2011; McKenzie et al., 2013). Tse et al. (2007) showed that the
removal of the entire HC as early as 48 h after the rapid learning
of two new flavor-place associations fully spared memory when
the rats were given extensive pre-training on six other flavor-place
associations, i.e., prior knowledge. Consistently, rats that lacked
prior knowledge displayed severe memory distortions after HC
removal. These results suggest that neocortical sites are capable
of rapid associative learning, if relevant prior knowledge is avail-
able. Moreover, in a subsequent study, Tse et al. (2011) provided
evidence that the shift of the indexing function from the HC to
the mPFC is not just a shift of locus, but rather a development
through concurrent HC-mPFC interactions [see initial evidence
for rapid memory consolidation in humans in Takashima et al.
(2009)]. In addition, McKenzie et al. (2013) showed that neurons
in the rat HC that were specific to certain trained goal locations
in a circular track were initially active during the learning of new
goals as well. As learning progressed, however, hippocampal activ-
ity patterns for old vs. new goal locations gradually diverged from
one another. These findings were taken to suggest that consolida-
tion involves both assimiliation of new information into existing
knowledge structures and accommodation of these structures to
ensure accurate memories, and that the HC plays a role in these
processes.
In studies with human participants, tracking consolidation
processes in the brain via the use of neuroimaging techniques has
become increasingly prominent. Takashima et al. (2006) assessed
changes in neural activation elicited by the retrieval of visual stim-
uli in a 3-month period after initial learning. Over the course of
the entire study, participants showed a decrease in HC activation
and an increase in mPFC-activity for confidently recognized pic-
tures (see also Yamashita et al., 2009). These findings suggest that
the mPFC takes over linking functions from the HC for retrieving
coherent remote memories (see also Yamashita et al., 2009). This
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reasoning is in accordance with an extended version of system
consolidation theory, which states that, at first, the HC is neces-
sary for storage and recovery of a memory trace. As consolidation
proceeds, however, HC contributions diminish and cortical struc-
tures suffice to maintain the memory trace and to mediate its
retrieval (Frankland and Bontempi, 2005; cf. Gais et al., 2007).
On the retrieval side, van Kesteren et al. (2010b) examined the
neural underpinnings of the congruency effect during retrieval
24 h after learning in a visuo-tactile learning paradigm. Word-
fabric combinations, which were either congruent or incongruent
with common knowledge [e.g., the word“tie” was presented with a
tie (congruent) or with a rubber (incongruent)] had to be associ-
ated with visual motifs. It was found that activity within the mPFC
and the somatosensory cortex as well as the connectivity between
the two areas was enhanced when motifs and associated words
could be retrieved correctly. This was not the case when only the
motifs were recognized without successful associative retrieval.
Moreover, the increase in functional connectivity was positively
correlated with the behavioral congruency benefit (i.e., more con-
gruent hits than incongruent hits) associated with pre-existing
knowledge across participants.
The finding of greater mPFC-activity for correctly remem-
bered congruent motifs matches the supposed role of the mPFC in
retrieval monitoring as providing a“feeling of rightness” for mem-
ory cues during retrieval. This monitoring function of the mPFC
is assumed to bias later processing in the limbic system, including
the HC (Moscovitch and Winocur, 2002). The existence of such a
“feeling of rightness” is based on the compatibility of the memory
cues with prior knowledge and is missing in confabulating patients
with lesions in the mPFC (Gilboa et al., 2006). In line with this
claim, in a recent review by Nieuwenhuis and Takashima (2011),
it was argued that the mPFC integrates information from the lim-
bic system and subsequently suppresses representations therein
(especially in the HC) that might not be needed for retrieving
information that fits prior knowledge. Based on this role of the
mPFC, finding greater mPFC involvement during the retrieval of
congruent compared to incongruent information seems conceiv-
able, as only the former type of information elicits a “feeling of
rightness.” However, thus far the hypothesis of less hippocam-
pal activation during the retrieval of congruent stimuli (due to
suppression from mPFC) has not received empirical support. Hip-
pocampal activity for congruent and incongruent stimuli did not
differ during retrieval (van Kesteren et al., 2010b).
Thus far it appears that the neural structures mainly associated
with system consolidation, i.e., MTL and mPFC, are also involved
in the formation and application of abstract knowledge. This may
not be a coincidence, as the effect of consolidation and the effect of
knowledge abstraction, i.e., forming a conceptual “gist,” resemble
each other (cf. Ellenbogen et al., 2007). However, our remember-
ing of remote episodes can certainly entail contextual details. In
this case, evidence suggests that the HC remains involved (Nadel
and Moscovitch, 1997).
LATERAL PFC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EFFECTS OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE
ON MEMORY
Despite the key role of the mPFC in recent literature on mem-
ory and knowledge, earlier studies have also demonstrated the
involvement of lateral parts of the PFC (lPFC) in memory
processes related to knowledge use, such as semantic elaboration
(e.g., Kapur et al., 1994; Wagner et al., 1998) and relational process-
ing of features contained in the to-be-remembered information
(e.g., Fletcher et al., 2000; Addis and McAndrews, 2006; Murray
and Ranganath, 2007). An early PET-study based on levels-of-
processing ideas showed that elaborative encoding, as compared
to shallow perceptual processing, goes along with increased activ-
ity in the left inferior frontal gyrus (Kapur et al., 1994). In line
with that, Wagner et al. (1998) found that activations in the left
lateral inferior frontal gyrus (together with left parahippocam-
pal and fusiform gyri) was higher for subsequently remembered
than for forgotten words. This finding indicates that elaborative
processes involving the left inferior frontal gyrus directly ben-
efit memory. Furthermore, a study that manipulated encoding
through instructions to either remember or forget the preceding
stimulus revealed that the condition in which participants had the
intention to encode was linked to an increased activity in the left
inferior frontal gyrus (Reber et al., 2002). Finally, a recent study by
Staresina et al. (2009) showed that congruent events (a match of
word/color combination during encoding, e.g., the word“balloon”
in front of a yellow background) yielded greater activation in the
left lateral inferior frontal gyrus than incongruent events (e.g., the
word “elephant” in front of a red background). Activation in the
lateral inferior frontal gyrus was stronger for later remembered
than for forgotten trials, indicating that its involvement in the task
is predictive of memory performance. Taken together, the inferior
frontal gyrus may be critically involved in semantic processing of
incoming information, which leads to better episodic memory.
Besides the left inferior frontal gyrus, the dorsolateral PFC is
contributing to the effects of knowledge on memory as well, sup-
posedly due to its role in building relationships between items
(Murray and Ranganath, 2007). In Murray and Ranganath’s (2007)
study, participants saw sequentially presented unrelated word pairs
and did either have to make a judgment concerning the rela-
tionship between the two words or concerning specific semantic
attributes of the second word. Encoding the word pairs in rela-
tion to each other lead to a better recognition of the word pairs
in an associative memory test. Activity in the dorsolateral PFC
was greater in the relational judgment condition compared to the
item-specific condition. Furthermore, activity in the dorsolateral
PFC predicted performance in the associative memory test. These
findings lead the authors to suggest that the dorsolateral PFC is
involved in the active processing of semantic relationships (Murray
and Ranganath, 2007).
In addition to semantic elaboration and relational processing,
the lPFC is also heavily involved in memory control processes
including monitoring. Memory control processes are crucial for
evaluating representations retrieved from the HC in the context
of current task goals, thereby allowing memory to be adaptive, in
particular whenever the retrieved representations resemble each
other or are both familiar (e.g., Ranganath et al., 2000; Mitchell
and Johnson, 2009).
Taken together, findings on the involvement of the lPFC in
memory processes related to knowledge use suggest that the lPFC
is linked to intentional memorizing processes including seman-
tic elaboration and relational processing. Given the literature
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discussed above that suggests lPFC involvement in a number of
memory processes related to knowledge use, we argue for the need
to integrate the lPFC into the picture when dealing with the effects
of prior knowledge on episodic memory. We will revisit this issue
in the following sections.
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING NEUROIMAGING DATA
Recent neuroimaging findings suggest that both mPFC and MTL
regions (particularly the HC) contribute to the formation and
utilization of knowledge and that they do so in an interactive fash-
ion. During the formation and application of complex conceptual
knowledge, it is proposed that the mPFC and the HC interact in
a way that the HC detects regularities across episodes, which are
integrated with value information (such as gains and losses, as
well as emotional valence) by the mPFC (Kumaran et al., 2009).
Along similar lines, Nieuwenhuis and Takashima (2011) proposed
that the mPFC integrates and weights information associated with
discrete episodes from the limbic system, namely the HC, the
amygdala, and the ventral striatum.
The neural correlates of memory processing in relation to prior
knowledge also involve a network comprised of HC and mPFC.
According to the model of van Kesteren et al. (2012), the HC
is involved in the detection and encoding of novel information
and information that is incongruent to the encoding context. The
mPFC deals with relating and integrating the incoming informa-
tion to the existing knowledge base. It acts like a resonance detector,
in the sense that information congruent to prior knowledge res-
onates with existing information. HC and mPFC processes, how-
ever, do not work independently of one another. It is assumed
that the HC encodes new experiences when novelty is high. When
the mPFC detects resonance, it will inhibit (or compete with) the
HC, as the new information can also be encoded via relation to
prior knowledge. Therefore, examining the interactions between
MTL and mPFC appears critical for understanding the effects of
prior knowledge on memory. While the model has received ini-
tial support especially concerning the role of the mPFC in prior
knowledge effects on memory, it has to be noted that the role
of MTL regions in memory processing of congruent/incongruent
information and its relation to mPFC is less clear and requires
further consideration and validation.
In addition to the mPFC, we also discussed lPFC involvement
in a number of memory processes related to knowledge use and
argued for the need to integrate the lPFC into the picture when
dealing with the effects of prior knowledge on memory. However, it
is currently unclear how the medial and lateral parts of the PFC dif-
fer in their contribution to knowledge-related memory processes.
The only explicit model available at the moment is one that focuses
on neural correlates of the predictive function of memory that is
based upon prior knowledge (Kroes and Fernández, 2012). In this
framework, the mPFC is assumed to contribute to the formation of
complex episodic memories and abstract knowledge, while the lat-
eral PFC contributes to simple rule learning. Concisely, the lPFC is
suggested to interact with the lateral/inferior temporal cortex and
to apply strict stimulus-response rules, whereas the mPFC acts in
concert with the HC to allow predictions based on abstract knowl-
edge transferable to new situations. These postulations will need
to be tested empirically.
Observing the involvements of mPFC and HC in both the for-
mation of knowledge and in the use of knowledge for memory, it is
now tempting to ask (a) to what extent the localizations of mPFC
and HC observed in these processes are overlapping within the
same person, and (b) how the mPFC-HC activations/interactions
observed in the building up of knowledge are related to the subse-
quent use of this knowledge in service of memory. These questions
call for a study to track the building up of knowledge and the use
of knowledge for memory within the same participants.
From a developmental viewpoint, the differentiation between
medial and lateral parts of the PFC in relation to knowledge-
related memory processing is very important. As we shall discuss
in the sections below, the development of the effects of prior
knowledge on memory have mostly been linked to functional and
structural changes in the lPFC. Given that some regions within the
mPFC also display a more protracted maturation trajectory (Shaw
et al., 2008), there are potentially important changes within the
functioning of the mPFC which support the above mentioned
development by using prior knowledge in service of memory
functioning.
THE DEVELOPMENTAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE
Knowledge accumulates in the course of life through experiences
during which the individual perceives and internalizes patterns in
his or her environment. As the growth of knowledge is especially
striking in early life, taking a developmental cognitive neuroscience
approach with a focus on child development offers the unique pos-
sibility of exploring the effects of an expanding knowledge base on
memory (Baltes et al., 2006; Craik and Bialystok, 2006).
First, we will provide an overview of general theorizing about
developmental changes in cognition across the lifespan. Second,
we will focus on how memory development is shaped by lifespan
changes on a neural and behavioral level. For the discussion of
developmental changes in the neural correlates of memory with
age, we will focus on both structural and functional development
of PFC and MTL and link changes in these areas to age differ-
ences in the use of prior knowledge for memory. We will expand
on this topic by highlighting parallel changes in the knowledge
base, which speaks to the issue of differences in the use of prior
knowledge with age. As we will show, these parallels are particu-
larly salient during child development, as childhood is the most
dynamic period of knowledge development (e.g., Li et al., 2004).
Hence, in the present review, the lifespan perspective provides
the frame for conceptualizing the specifics concerning the influ-
ence of an emerging knowledge base on memory during child-
hood. We will argue that, to measure age differences in the effects of
prior knowledge on episodic memory, it is necessary to distinguish
the availability of prior knowledge from its accessibility.
GENERAL CONCEPTIONS OF LIFESPAN CHANGES IN COGNITION
Knowledge is known to increase strikingly during childhood, to
continue to accumulate throughout adulthood, to remain rather
stable in old age, and to only decrease in very old age (Baltes, 1987;
Li et al., 2004; Craik and Bialystok, 2006). As emphasized by Craik
and Bialystok (2006), however, knowledge does not act indepen-
dently. Even if there is no decrease in available knowledge with age,
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aging goes along with difficulties to access this knowledge. Older
adults often express problems naming known objects even though,
in principle, the names are available to them. This impairment in
older adults could be linked to a temporary inability to access
their knowledge, which can be overcome by giving appropriate
cues or by offering more time (Cohen and Burke, 1993; Hasher
et al., 2001). This nicely illustrates that knowledge can be avail-
able, but not accessible. In the framework offered by Craik and
Bialystok (2006), the decrease in the ability to access knowledge
is subsumed under the term cognitive control, which is known to
increase steeply from infancy to young adulthood, and to decline
thereafter (Bunge et al., 2002; Diamond, 2002; Zelazo et al., 2004).
The framework by Craik and Bialystok (2006) resembles the
two-component model of lifespan cognition by Baltes et al. (2006).
With regard to intellectual functioning across the lifespan, Baltes
and colleagues distinguish between the mechanics and the prag-
matics of cognition. The former are closely associated with the
biological brain status, known to increase until early adulthood,
and to decrease constantly thereafter. The latter are associated with
the knowledge base, which is shaped by the socio-cultural envi-
ronment. The cognitive pragmatics are shown to increase well
into adulthood and to remain relatively stable until old age (Li
et al., 2004). These comprehensive frameworks of cognitive change
across the lifespan support the claim that the availability of knowl-
edge on the one hand, and control processes allowing access to this
knowledge on the other hand, follow strikingly different lifespan
trajectories. Hence, when comparing age groups across the lifes-
pan regarding a specific domain such as episodic memory, the
common and unique contributions of cognitive mechanics and
pragmatics need to be taken into account.
CONCEPTIONS OF LIFESPAN CHANGES IN EPISODIC MEMORY AND
THE NEED TO INTEGRATE THE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE PERSPECTIVE
Grounded in the comprehensive treatments of lifespan cognitive
development, Shing,Werkle-Bergner, Lindenberger and colleagues
[Shing et al. (2008, 2010); Werkle-Bergner et al. (2006)] proposed
a framework that distinguishes two components to account for
changes in episodic memory across the lifespan: an associative
component, which refers to mechanisms of binding different fea-
tures of a memory episode into a coherent representation, and
a strategic component referring to control processes which aid
both encoding and retrieval. The two components are assumed
to interact and to differ in terms of their lifespan trajectory. The
associative component, which is linked to the development of the
MTL, is proposed to reach its high functionality already in middle
childhood. The strategic component, which is linked to the devel-
opment of the PFC, is assumed to show a protracted development
and to increase in its functionality until young adulthood. Both
components are hypothesized to undergo senescent decline in late
adulthood and old age. Therefore, children’s difficulties in episodic
memory performance are linked to immature strategic operations,
whereas deficits among older adults are linked to impairments in
both associative and strategic operations (Werkle-Bergner et al.,
2006; Shing et al., 2008, 2010).
So far, there is no explicit handling of the general knowl-
edge base’s lifespan changes in relation to the associative and
strategic components of memory development. Nevertheless,
understanding lifespan changes of the general knowledge base
may contribute to an improved understanding of memory devel-
opment. Initial evidence for this view comes from research on
expertise and memory performance. Schneider et al. (1993) com-
pared children and adults with both high and low chess expertise.
The children and adults with high expertise remembered chess
positions comparably well and much better than children and
adults with low expertise. In a control digit span task, adults out-
performed children, independent of chess expertise. This lead the
authors to conclude that a rich knowledge base of a specific domain
strongly affects memory for newly learned information within that
domain and can even lead to a reversal of typical age trends.
Relating these findings to the two-component framework of
lifespan changes in episodic memory (Shing et al., 2008, 2010),
one could argue that prior knowledge exerts its influence on
the strategic component only, as controlling for strategic oper-
ations attenuates performance differences between children and
young adults (Brehmer et al., 2007; Shing et al., 2008). Indeed,
as discussed above, PFC-driven strategic encoding and retrieval
operations such as elaborative encoding or explicit memory search
play a role in the observed memory benefits (Craik and Tulving,
1975; Anderson, 1981), presumably via affecting the accessibility
of prior knowledge. Recent findings from neuroimaging, how-
ever, revealed joint changes in mPFC and HC activation and
in the connectivity between the two that underpin the emer-
gence and application of prior knowledge (Kumaran et al., 2009,
2012; van Kesteren et al., 2010a,b). Furthermore, system-level
consolidation was shown to be facilitated when relevant prior
knowledge was available (Tse et al., 2007). These findings suggest
that prior knowledge might do more than just influence PFC-
driven strategic operations; they suggest that prior knowledge
drives the interaction between PFC and MTL regions, possibly
leading to more efficient learning and consolidation processes
(van Kesteren et al., 2010a,b). These novel findings call for fur-
ther theoretical specification and empirical validation of the two-
component framework incorporating knowledge base as a pos-
sible factor driving the interaction between the strategic and the
associative component.
DEVELOPMENT OF NEURAL CORRELATES OF MEMORY DURING
CHILDHOOD
As discussed above, MTL and PFC regions are crucially related to
(a) the formation and application of knowledge and (b) episodic
memory functioning. As apparent from structural neuroimag-
ing work on brain development, these regions exhibit differential
developmental trajectories. While maturation takes longest in pre-
frontal and parietal areas, the MTL as a whole does not show
large structural changes during early and middle childhood, even
though this might be different for some subregions (Sowell et al.,
2003; Gogtay et al., 2006; Lavenex and Lavenex, 2013). The mPFC
seems to display a more complex maturation trajectory that differs
between the subregions (Shaw et al., 2008). Concisely, the orbital
and posterior parts (BA 25, BA 32, posterior parts of BA 12 and
BA 11) of the mPFC follow an early maturation pattern, whereas
its anterior and dorsal parts (BA 10 and anterior parts of BA 12
and BA 11) follow the trajectory of the lateral PFC, which is late
maturing (Shaw et al., 2008).
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These structural findings suggest that functions associated with
the PFC (i.e., strategic/control processes) might develop more
slowly than the ones associated with the MTL (i.e., associative
processes). This idea is supported by a study in which the subse-
quent memory paradigm was used to reveal activations associated
with successful remembering (Ofen et al., 2007). Ofen et al. (2007)
showed that activation for later remembered scenes in contrast to
forgotten scenes increases with age in the PFC, but not in the MTL
(see converging behavioral findings from Brehmer et al., 2007;
Shing et al., 2008).
There is, however, also evidence for continued functional devel-
opment in MTL regions until early adolescence (Ghetti et al.,
2010). In Ghetti et al.’s (2010) study, children (aged 8–11), ado-
lescents (aged 14), and young adults were given an incidental
encoding task in which they saw colored drawings and had to
decide whether the depicted object could be found in a house or
whether the object was animate. Later, in a surprise recognition
task, participants were asked to state whether they had seen the
drawing in the scanner and, if so, in what color. For this detail
recollection task, adults and adolescents engaged regions of the
HC and of the posterior parahippocampal gyrus, whereas chil-
dren did not. This study differs from Ofen et al. (2007) as it entails
a greater need for recollection processes due to the requirement
of remembering contextual details of the encoding episode (the
color of the drawing, which was randomly assigned). Therefore,
age differences in MTL involvement in an episodic memory task
might also be dependent on task factors such as the demand for
associative binding. Whereas MTL regions can therefore be con-
sidered critical for the formation of new episodic memories, their
role for the acquisition of knowledge is less clear. An early study
by Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997) revealed that early hippocampal
damage does not preclude the acquisition of new knowledge, as
their patients, despite suffering from damage to the HC from early
age on, showed average performance in tests of factual knowledge.
In addition to changes in MTL and PFC regions, age-related
changes in brain areas specialized for specific domain knowl-
edge may come along with age differences in memory as well
(Ofen, 2012). Evidence can be gathered both from behavioral
studies on the influence of growth in knowledge base on mem-
ory (reviewed in the next section), and from recent neuroimaging
findings. These studies revealed prolonged maturation in brain
areas processing specific domain knowledge and linked this mat-
uration to increases in memory performance (Golarai et al., 2007;
Chai et al., 2010). By comparing children, adolescents, and young
adults, Golarai et al. (2007) showed that the right fusiform face
area and the left parahippocampal place area, two functionally
defined areas important for faces and places, showed a substantial
age-related increase in size. Moreover, this increase was correlated
with improved recognition memory for faces and places. In a sim-
ilar vein, a subsequent study by Chai et al. (2010) showed that the
age-related expansion of the parahippocampal place area is corre-
lated with better memory for complex scenes in participants aged
8–24.
In sum, brain regions that underpin memory differ regarding
the time course during which they develop. While MTL regions are
relatively mature already during middle childhood (but see Ghetti
et al., 2010), the lPFC and parts of the mPFC show a protracted
development which continues until late adolescence/young adult-
hood. Taking into account brain areas that are specialized for
specific domain knowledge adds to this pattern as those areas
display a prolonged maturation that could be related to memory
performance. While the distinction between influences of PFC-
and MTL-development on memory performance has recently
gained considerable attention (see e.g., Ofen et al., 2007; Ghetti
et al., 2010; Shing et al., 2010), future research will have to take the
development of domain-specific areas into account as well.
DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS RELATION TO THE NEURAL
CORRELATES OF MEMORY
As discussed thus far, more elaborated semantic networks con-
tribute to memory improvements with age. In accordance with
this, children’s episodic memory has been shown to be influenced
by their semantic knowledge about the to-be-remembered stimuli.
For example, in an early study by Schneider et al. (1989), children
(third, fifth, and seventh graders) who possessed a broad knowl-
edge of soccer showed better recall of a soccer story than children
that did not possess such soccer-related knowledge.
Earlier behavioral studies that assessed congruency effects in
children of different ages revealed an age-related increase in the
tendency to remember congruent information as opposed to
incongruent information (Geis and Hall, 1978; Ghatala et al., 1980,
for a meta-analysis see Stangor and McMillan, 1992). For exam-
ple, in Ghatala et al. (1980), children aged 8–14 answered questions
about 36 words that were either congruent with the questions (yes-
answers) or incongruent (no-answers) and had to recall the words
afterwards. A linear increase in recall accuracy with age was found
for the congruent condition, whereas no change in recall accuracy
with age was found for the incongruent condition. This increase
in congruency effect with age was interpreted based on the levels-
of-processing framework (Craik and Lockhart, 1972): although
all words can be understood by all participants, older children
have more opportunities to elaborate on the to-be encoded word
because semantic knowledge grows with age. Ghatala et al. (1980),
however, acknowledge that their findings are also consistent with a
retrieval-related interpretation. This interpretation would suggest
that older children engage more in strategic retrieval and might
use the encoding questions as cues during recall, which is easier if
the word matches its question (i.e., is congruent).
In a study with children aged 8–11, Maril et al. (2011) used the
semantic congruency effect to manipulate the accessibility of prior
knowledge in an item-color pairing paradigm, in which subjects
had to decide whether a word/color combination was plausible. In
an fMRI-analysis which took into account congruency as well as
age, Maril et al. (2011) showed that adults rely more on structures
in the parietal cortex and in the left lPFC (which, as mentioned
before, can be linked to semantic processing), whereas children
recruit more posterior brain areas (i.e., the right occipital cortex)
associated with perceptual processing. Based on these findings,
Maril et al. (2011) suggest that children may initially depend more
on posterior perceptual systems in service of memory function-
ing, and, with age, develop more elaborative (semantic) knowledge
structures. This extensive semantic knowledge base is then used for
a more elaborative encoding, which, as shown by a main effect of
age, is generally beneficial for memory.
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In sum, Maril et al.’s (2011) study on the neural correlates of
an age-related increase in the congruency effect suggests a rise in
the use of semantic knowledge structures for remembering (Maril
et al., 2011). This might go along with a decreasing importance of
mere perceptual encoding, as indicated by a posterior-to-anterior
shift in brain activation, and with an increasing importance of
PFC-driven strategic encoding. This reasoning is in accordance
with the developmental trajectory of gist vs. verbatim knowledge
as proposed by Brainerd et al. (2004), a notion that we will turn to
in the next section. Thus far, however, most developmental studies
have not disentangled age-related differences between the avail-
ability and the accessibility and use of prior knowledge. We will
discuss these issues in the summary section.
THE FLIPSIDE OF KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT
Does the accumulation of knowledge in the course of life improve
memory performance in all situations? Evidence against this view
is provided by research on false memory. In the DRM-paradigm
(Deese, 1959; Roediger and McDermott, 1995), words that seman-
tically converge to a common theme are presented during encod-
ing. Later at recognition, participants are tested on their memory
for the words studied beforehand. In addition, semantically related
words never studied at encoding (critical lures) are also presented
and participants are asked to reject those lures. In adult partici-
pants, the probability of falsely endorsing the critical lures is as
high as that of the presented items. False recognition of seman-
tically related words increases during childhood (Metzger et al.,
2008; Paz-Alonso et al., 2008). Using the DRM-paradigm, Paz-
Alonso et al. (2008) showed a correlation between the age-related
increase in false alarms to critical lures and activation changes in
the left ventrolateral PFC, which has been shown to be important
for semantic elaboration (Wagner et al., 1998).
The DRM-paradigm illustrates that the more elaborate seman-
tic knowledge structures of older children may improve the extrac-
tion of gist-like traces as opposed to the less semantic processing
of younger children. This in turn leads to a higher likelihood
of endorsing critical lures in older children (for a similar argu-
ment, see Smith and Hunt, 1998). Similar findings could also
be revealed in an induction task (Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004)
in which category (semantically)-based induction and similarity
(perceptually)-based induction were disentangled. Adults typi-
cally perform induction in a category-based (semantic) man-
ner, whereas children rely more on similarity-based (perceptual)
induction. Category-based induction led to little discrimination
between items presented during the induction task and lures that
belonged to the same semantic category (e.g., another exemplar
of the category cat). Similar to the findings using the DRM-
paradigm,children displayed a higher memory accuracy compared
to adults, which was due to a lower false alarm rate. Accord-
ingly, training children to perform category-based induction lead
to a memory performance comparable to the one of adults
(Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004). These results show that relying on
prior knowledge is not always beneficial for episodic memory
performance. In specific situations where perceptual informa-
tion is important, a reversal of typical age effects, i.e., children
outperforming adults, can be found. This is due to the chil-
dren’s stronger reliance on perceptual as compared to semantic
processing, which is more prone to false memories because of
overgeneralization.
SUMMARY AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this review, we discussed the influence of prior knowledge on
memory considering both the psychology and the cognitive neu-
roscience literature. We reviewed classical psychology experiments
that demonstrate the impact of prior knowledge on remembering
new information (Bransford and Johnson, 1972; Craik and Tul-
ving, 1975). We integrated the emerging cognitive neuroscience
perspective on this topic, which points to PFC and MTL regions
displaying activity changes as a function of prior knowledge. More
specifically, recent studies suggest a prominent role of the vmPFC
and the HC in underpinning the formation and application of
prior knowledge (Kumaran et al., 2009, 2012; van Kesteren et al.,
2010a,b). Both areas were shown to play a key role in consoli-
dation as well. This is a conceivable idea given that the effect of
consolidation and the effect of knowledge formation and applica-
tion resemble each other, i.e., forming of a conceptual “gist” which
might later be applied as a search frame during retrieval. More-
over, recent research indicates an activity increase in the vmPFC
during post-consolidation periods (e.g., Takashima et al., 2006),
which may occur earlier if new information can be assimilated
into existing knowledge structures (Tse et al., 2007).
In addition, we outlined a developmental cognitive neuro-
science perspective, considering changes in brain structure and
function across child development and linking those changes to
behavioral research on age differences in the influence of prior
knowledge on memory. To conclude, we will now outline open
questions and possible confounds regarding the assessment and
interpretation of age-related changes in the use of prior knowledge
for remembering.
First, to assess age differential effects of prior knowledge on
episodic memory in an age comparative setting, we postulate that
it is necessary to distinguish the availability of prior knowledge
from its accessibility and use. As mentioned above, one of the most
prominent changes in human ontogeny is growth in knowledge,
that is, an increase in the availability of prior knowledge. During
the course of the review, we have discussed a number of studies
(Ghatala et al., 1980; Schneider et al., 1989, 1993; Maril et al., 2011)
which revealed that a certain amount of performance differences
in memory tasks between children and adults can be attributed to
adults knowing more about the to-be-remembered information.
This was most prominently shown in experiments that compared
children and adults, with the children being experts in a domain,
whereas the adults are not. In this case, children can outperform
adults in a memory task that is closely related to their field of exper-
tise (e.g., Schneider et al., 1993). However, using expert groups of
different age to uncover differential memory effects of availability
vs. accessibility of prior knowledge comes along with difficulties
as well, as there are many uncontrollable sources of differences
between the age groups (for example, different histories of gain-
ing expertise; Schneider et al., 1993). An alternative approach for
future experiments might be to control the availability of prior
knowledge either by carefully assessing the participants’knowledge
of the stimulus material, or, perhaps even better, by experimentally
inducing new knowledge structures that are comparable between
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the different age groups. This experimentally induced knowledge
subsequently serves as prior knowledge for the learning of new,
related information. An example of this approach was provided
in a recent behavioral study (Kumaran, 2013) in which it was
shown that prior knowledge about a hierarchy facilitates transi-
tive inference in a new, partly overlapping hierarchy. Participants
first acquired a seven-item hierarchy and then performed transi-
tive inference on two new nine-item hierarchies. One of the new
nine-item hierarchies contained five items of the old seven-item
hierarchy, arranged in their original position in the hierarchy (thus
forming a scaffold), the other one was entirely new. Participants
performed significantly better in the overlapping hierarchy con-
dition as compared to the entirely new hierarchy. These results
suggest that prior knowledge benefits transitive inference perfor-
mance via a contextual transfer that relates new information to the
existing knowledge scaffold.
In sum, studies that use experimentally induced knowledge can
greatly benefit our understanding of the effects of prior knowl-
edge on memory, especially for developmental questions They
have several advantages: first, they allow careful monitoring of the
knowledge available to the participant, thus excluding the possi-
bility that knowledge structures are just not comparable between
the two groups. Second, the degree of prior knowledge can be
experimentally manipulated, which enables researchers to look
at the effects of strength of prior knowledge on memory. Third,
the phase during which the participants acquire the knowledge
can itself be subject to investigation, which would allow relating
learning performance to later memory performance. This would
provide a link between work on the emergence of knowledge (e.g.,
Kumaran et al., 2009, 2012) with work on the effects of prior
knowledge on memory (e.g., van Kesteren et al., 2010a,b).
Regarding the ability to access and use one’s prior knowledge
for memory, the PFC (both medial and lateral aspects) has been
shown to be important. Recent studies on the use of prior knowl-
edge for memory (van Kesteren et al., 2010a,b) point to a key role
of the mPFC, which is assumed to act as a resonance detector
to determine congruency with prior knowledge. When congru-
ent information is detected, the mPFC might inhibit hippocampal
activity and the information is directly integrated into existing
knowledge structures (van Kesteren et al., 2012). This reasoning
is in line with other claims suggesting that the mPFC provides a
“feeling of rightness” during retrieval (Moscovitch and Winocur,
2002) and that it acts as a value integrator during the building up of
knowledge (Kumaran et al., 2009). In an attempt to integrate these
three conceptualizations, we hypothesize that the mPFC plays a
monitoring role for episodic memories by providing an evaluation
of fit of both internally and externally generated representations
with prior knowledge. In line with a recent review (Nieuwenhuis
and Takashima, 2011), we suggest that, based on this evaluation
of fit, the mPFC impacts memory processing in the limbic system,
especially in the HC.
Besides the mPFC, the lPFC is also important for memory
processes related to accessing and using knowledge, including
semantic elaboration and strategic encoding and retrieval (e.g.,
Wagner et al., 1998; Fletcher et al., 2000; Murray and Ran-
ganath, 2007). These functions differ from the ones associated
with the mPFC, which might indicate that mPFC and lPFC
differ in their contribution to the effects of prior knowledge on
memory, depending on the requirements of the memory task at
hand. On the one hand, the mPFC might mainly be involved
in situations that highlight the congruency of new information
with prior knowledge, its task being to evaluate the fit between the
target information and expectancies based on prior knowledge.
This evaluation is particularly relevant when different behavioral
choices are involved in the process of building up the prior knowl-
edge (e.g., choices that entail gains or losses). On the other hand,
the lPFC might be involved when there is a strategic/intentional
attempt to integrate and relate new knowledge with existing
knowledge structures. These conjectures will need to be validated
empirically.
Coming back to the development of the use of prior knowledge
for memory, the PFC, and in particular its lateral parts, is known
to mature late and to reach its full functionality in early adult-
hood only (Sowell et al., 2003). Therefore, it seems plausible that
children do not use their prior knowledge as efficiently as young
adults do. This would point to a key role of the PFC in the devel-
opment of the use of prior knowledge for memory and would also
converge with general assumptions about the increasing influence
of memory functions that are mediated by the PFC (Shing et al.,
2010). Further evidence for this claim has been revealed in behav-
ioral studies that point to an increase in the use of supposedly
PFC-driven memory strategies well into adolescence (Schneider
et al., 2002; Brehmer et al., 2007; Paz-Alonso et al., 2008; Shing
et al., 2008). Accordingly, fMRI and event-related potential (ERP)
studies could link the development of memory for context and
details, known to particularly require strategic/cognitive control
functions, to the maturation of PFC networks (e.g., Cycowicz et al.,
2001; Ofen et al., 2007). Taken together, the literature on mem-
ory development so far has placed much emphasis on the lateral
PFC as a driving force of age-related improvements in memory
functioning across childhood.
In addition, we postulate that it is worthwhile taking a closer
look on the developmental role that the mPFC may play in sup-
porting knowledge use in memory. It is interesting to note that
parts of the mPFC (Shaw et al., 2008) display a protracted struc-
tural development. The extent to which this has implications for
the functional contributions of the mPFC to the access and use
of prior knowledge for memory is yet unknown. If the func-
tional developmental trajectory of parts of the mPFC relevant
for knowledge processing resembles the trajectory of the lPFC,
an increase in mPFC activation should track the increasing use
of knowledge for memory with age. At the same time, due to
the fact that children constantly have to build-up new knowledge
and update their knowledge structures, the amount of available
knowledge increases rapidly during childhood and adolescence.
In Piagetian terms, accommodation (changing existing schemas)
occurs as long as we continue to learn (Piaget, 1951). There-
fore, the involvement of mPFC in building up knowledge may
be starting early. Children, although being experts at building
up new knowledge, seem to differ from young adults, however,
when it comes to accessing and using knowledge strategically.
Tackling the factors that limit the strategical use of knowledge by
experimentally ensuring the existence of comparable knowledge
structures in children and young adults will be highly interesting
and relevant to developmental as well as educational scholars.
Research into age differences in the use of prior knowledge for
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memory might prospectively serve to foster learning environ-
ments that are better tailored to the way that children acquire
knowledge. Given the working hypothesis that children do not
use their knowledge as efficiently as young adults, it is tempt-
ing to search for ways to foster the use of knowledge in chil-
dren, for example via training the children on memory strate-
gies (e.g., Brehmer et al., 2007; Shing et al., 2008). An efficient
use of knowledge may eliminate age differences in learning and
memory performance, as shown in the expertise literature (e.g.,
Schneider et al., 1993).
In sum, our knowledge of the world is quickly changing and
increasing during the first decades of the lifespan. Therefore,
a developmental perspective on understanding how the human
brain makes use of its accumulated knowledge and how it guides
future learning as well as behavior, seems to be highly called for.
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